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Abstract 
This paper concerns the relationship between acculturation in acquisitions ( ଵܺ), the acquirer’s acquisition strategy (ܺଶ), and 
organizational integration (ܺଷ) between acquirer and target organizations, as well as their interactive effect ( ଵܺܺଶܺଷ) on post-
acquisition performance. The empirical results drawn by 154 acquisitions in the Taiwanese electronics and information sector 
reveal the existence of three-way interaction and show: (1) related acquisition with high degree of acculturation and integration is 
associated with high performance, whereas unrelated acquisition with low degree of acculturation and high degree of integration 
is associated with high performance; (2) organizational integration positively moderates the relationship between acculturation and 
performance; (3) integration has a stronger moderating effect in related acquisitions than in unrelated acquisitions. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the International Strategic Management Conference. 
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1. Introduction 
Acquisition has long been an interesting topic in various streams of management literature. In human resources 
studies, acculturation in acquisitions ( ଵܺ) is argued to affect employee retention and manager turnover of the target 
firm (e.g., Cartwright & Cooper, 1993; Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001; Stahl & Voigt, 2008) because employees of the 
acquired firms constantly face pressure to conform to the norms and values of the acquirers (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 
1991). A high turnover of top management team (TMT) and loss of human and social resources in the acquired firm 
can ultimately have a deleterious impact on acquisitions. Studies of strategic management (e.g., Hill et al., 1992; 
Miller, 2006) emphasize the importance of the acquirer’s acquisition strategy (ܺଶ) and consider different type of 
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acquisition as different means to achieve acquisition gains. In organizational management literature, post-acquisition 
organizational integration (ܺଷ) is argued to be central in theories of organizational design because the execution of a 
well-designed integration process is important to maximize value creation and minimize value destruction following 
the acquisition (e.g., Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Puranam et al., 2009). 
Scholars studying integration and acculturation describe the choice between complete absorption and autonomy 
maintenance (Håkanson, 1995; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991) as an important initial decision that further shapes 
integration actions and acculturation processes, and find no type of integration (Puranam et al., 2009; Zollo & Singh, 
2004) and acculturation (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988; Stahl & Voigt, 2008) is ideal in all acquisitions. Three 
important relationships among acquirer’s strategy, acculturation and organization in acquisitions are also suggested 
by previous management literature: 1) acquirer’s strategic intension affects the degree of acculturation following an 
acquisition (Håkanson, 1995; Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001); 2) the extent of post-acquisition integration depends on the 
strategic contexts (Hill et al., 1992); 3) the degree of acculturation depends on both benefits and costs associated to 
post-acquisition integration (Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001). Since these three management decisions ( ଵܺ , ܺଶ , ܺଷ ) 
accumulatively contribute to a successful acquisition, there is a need to develop a integrated model simultaneously 
examineing their separate effects and accumulated impact on acquisitions. By integrating these three relationships, 
this study examines the three-way interaction ( ଵܺܺଶ  ܺଷ ) between acquisition strategy, acculturation, and 
organizational integration, along with its consequential effect on post-acquisition performance. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
2.1. Acculturation and the acquirer’s acquisition strategy 
Acculturation in acquisitions refers to the “outcome of a cooperative process whereby the belief, assumptions and 
values of two previous independent work forces form a jointly determined culture” (Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001: 1574) 
and whether acculturation is achieved depends upon how well the acquirer manages informal integration process. 
Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988) concern the role of the acquirer’s multiculturalism vs. uniculturalism in the 
acculturation processes following acquisitions. Acquirers characterized by multiculturalism allow acquired firms to 
preserve their existing culture and business practice, while acquirers characterized by uniculturalism decisively 
emphasize the common values, norms, beliefs and reward systems in the merged organization in order to achieve 
consistency in corporate goals, strategies and practices. In related acquisitions, economies of scale and scope generally 
result from utilizing tangible (e.g., joint purchase of inputs, joint development of exploratory/exploitative 
technologies) or intangible (e.g., know-how and knowledge transfer) interrelationships between the acquiring and 
acquired firms. With tight integration and coordination, redundancy can be minimized through restructuring 
organizations and redesigning standard operational procedures. From a different perspective, it is suggested that high 
performance over a prolonged period in related acquisitions requires a strong and adaptive uniculture, and therefore 
high degrees of acculturation. Conversely, unrelated acquisitions are oriented toward optimizing capital and resource 
allocation, as well as exploring new products and technologies in new markets or industries (Jones & Hill, 1988). The 
acquired firms’ complementary resources and capabilities allow the merged entity to explore and take advantages of 
new opportunities. Nevertheless, due to the fact that the acquirer’s and the acquired firm’s technological capabilities 
are unrelated, autonomy in the acquired firm and multi-culture in the merged organization should be emphasized. 
Thus, lower degrees of acculturation are required in unrelated acquisitions. 
H1a: In related acquisitions, acculturation positively affects post-acquisition performance.  
H1b: In unrelated acquisitions, acculturation negatively affects post-acquisition performance 
2.2. Acquisition and organizational integration 
Organizational integration, the level of interaction and coordination between the target and acquiring firms 
(Larsson & Finkelstein 1999), brings activities to be combined within the common organizational boundaries 
following an acquisition (Puranam et al., 2009), and acquirers can use common authority, incentives and processes to 
enhance coordination and mutual adaptation to reduce operational costs (Datta, 1991). However, radical changes in 
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the acquired firms could lead to intervention, disruption and crash (Hannan & Freeman, 1987). In Puranam and 
Srikanath’s (2007) study, two major effects, namely coordination effect and loss of autonomy effect, are identified in 
post-acquisition integration. Coordination effect usually occurs by minimizing functional redundancy and jointing 
daily activities, helping the acquirer leverage the acquired firm’s capability. However, loss of autonomy can prevent 
employees from devoting to explorative activities and damage the acquired firm’s technological capability (Puranam 
et al., 2006, 2009). Despite that, “organizational integration between jointing firms should have a positive effect on 
synergy realization because little, or poorly executed integration and coordination are unlikely to produce substantial 
joint benefits” (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999: 6). 
In additional to its impact on formal structure and systems of the merged unit, organizational integration also shapes 
informal processes by creating informal communication channels and group identity beneficial to sharing values and 
knowledge transfer (Puranam et al., 2009). These informal influences may be strengthened if organizational 
integration also brings high degrees of interaction between the merging firms, along with mutually coordinative efforts 
to the quality of interaction (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999). Once acquisition synergy comes from economies of scope 
exploiting interrelationships between the merging units, a high degree of integration will be necessary in order to 
promote divisional cooperation and coordination within the new organization. Due to lack of autonomy, activities of 
the acquired firm increasingly depend on operational and strategic decisions of the acquirer, which may accompany 
redirection and redefinition of missions and objectives, as well as destroy the acquired firm’s previous identity and 
culture. In turn, if an acquired firm is active in technological and product domains different from the acquirer, 
autonomy should be granted, for autonomy helps to maintain identification and culture and causes limited disruption, 
so that pre-existing technological and manufacturing capabilities may prosper constantly. Thus, acculturation in a 
related acquisition demands higher integration than in an unrelated acquisition.   As the basic premise of this study is 
that acquisition strategy, acculturation, and organizational integration will interact to determine post-acquisition 
performance, I propose that 
H2: The interaction between acquisition strategy, acculturation, and organizational integration will have a 
significantly positive effect on post-acquisition performance. 
2.3. The moderating role of organizational integration in the relationships between acculturation and performance 
Considering systems and procedures, organizational integration typically generates cooperation, coordination, as 
well as common goals and authority between members of the acquiring and acquired firms. As for informal 
organizational processes, integration helps to create organizational identity, common knowledge, and informal 
communication channels (Puranam et al., 2009). In order to realize the potential benefits of the transaction, both 
related and unrelated acquisitions require sufficient integration (Datta, 1991; Zollo & Singh, 2004), for no or little 
interaction and coordination are unlikely to generate substantial joint benefits. In light of the contingency perspective, 
I further argue that acquisition integration, which consists of interaction and coordination, can moderate the 
relationship between proper acculturation and acquisition performance for two reasons. Firstly, when complex or 
various tasks are divided into subtasks for different organizational subunits, those subunits in both the acquiring and 
the acquired firms must integrate their resources to finish the common organizational goals. In order to achieve the 
whole goals, organizational integration across combined firms is required to establish a common and collective 
identification, which largely builds on cooperation and common organization goals (Van der Vegt et al., 2003). 
Secondly, based on social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978) that concerns how people perceive themselves and process 
information about in-group and out-group, employees in the process of combination tend to perceive dissimilar others 
as out-group members and may have less helping behaviors (Van der Vegt & Van de Vliert, 2005). With increasing 
level of integration, however, a member who perceives to be dissimilar from the other group members will frequently 
interact with the other group members, which can increase helping behaviors and a common organizational 
identification. Following the logic above, this study argues 
H3a: In related acquisitions, organizational integration positively moderates the relationship between 
acculturation and acquisition performance. 
H3b: In unrelated acquisitions, organizational integration positively moderates the relationship between 
acculturation and acquisition performance. 
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2.4. The strength difference of organizational integration’s moderating effects in different acquisition type 
In acquisitions, the level of integration presents the extent to which the functions of the acquired organization are 
linked to, or aligned with the equivalent functions of the acquirer (Zollo & Singh, 2004). Drawing on Thompson’s 
(1967) pioneering work, the required extent of post-acquisition integration is determined by the degree of task 
interdependence, capability transfer as well as mutual learning and adaptation necessary for acquisition 
implementation (Puranam et al., 2009). Among Thompson’s (1967) model of pooled, sequential, and reciprocal 
interdependence between divisions, reciprocal interdependence is argued to require the highest degree of integration, 
whereas pooled interdependence the lowest (Puranam et al., 2009). In related acquisitions, the benefit of potential 
economics of scope arises from jointly shared or utilized inputs in related activities (Jones & Hill, 1988). Moreover, 
tangible and intangible resources of the acquiring and acquired firms are exploited to achieve synergy. In other words, 
economies of related acquisitions are realized through reciprocal and sequential interdependence. In order to 
coordinate activities between both merged units, high degrees of integration is consequently necessary (Hoskisson et 
al., 1993). In turn, economies of internal capital markets arising from unrelated acquisitions is primarily understood 
as markets and hierarchies paradigm (Williamson, 1985), indicating that unrelated acquisitions can overcome external 
capital market difficulties by using internal auditing and performance monitoring systems. Firms adopting unrelated 
acquisitions tend to expose the acquired firms to the discipline of an efficient internal capital market, thereby 
improving the acquired firm’s profitability (Jones & Hill, 1988; Harrison et al., 2001). Additionally, value is 
established by exploiting top managers’ ability of control unfamiliar firms, which is better than the existing managers 
of the acquired firm. This strategy also frees top mangers of the acquirer from involving in daily activities of the target 
firms. Therefore, economies of unrelated acquisitions are mainly realized through pooled interdependence. As a result, 
unrelated acquisitions, compared with related acquisitions, require relatively less organizational. As H3 predicts that 
high level of organizational integration can enhance the transmission of proper degree of acculturation to superior 
post-acquisition performance, this study further suggests that 
H4: The moderating effect of organizational integration in related acquisitions is stronger than that in unrelated 
acquisitions. 
3. Method 
3.1. Data collection 
Focusing on the Taiwanese electronics and information industry, this study collects data at financial, organizational 
and industrial levels to examine whether the interaction of acquisition strategy, organizational integration, and 
acculturation influences post-acquisition performance. Corporate financial data were collected from the Securities and 
Futures Commission databases, Ministry of Finance and the Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 
Taiwan, whereas organizational level data from the top 1000 Taiwanese electronics and computer firms reported by 
China Credit Information Service. The former criteria ensure that the acquired firms in the sample were publicly 
traded. Standard Industrial Classification codes in Taiwan (Taiwanese SIC, rev. 9, 2011, encoded on the basis of 
International Standard Industrial Classification codes, ISIC 4.0, 2006) were used to define an industry, where firms 
with two-digit SIC industries are treated as the same industry (Jacquemin & Berry, 1979). Based on the data, 387 of 
top 1000 firms had undertaken acquisitions between 2002 and 2008. Questionnaires were distributed to divisional 
managers of these 387 merged units in the next year of the acquisition, and 150 of them were returned. Given that the 
response rate was only 38%, possible non-response bias was therefore proofed, in which the respondents and non-
respondents were compared along the dimension of firm annual sales in the year of 2008 for both the acquiring and 
acquired firms. The calculated t-statistic values were .34 (the acquirers) and .14 (the acquired firms), suggesting no 
significant differences between the responding and the non-responding groups. 
3.2. Dependent variables 
The primary dependent variable, post-acquisition performance, is the change in market value (οMarket Value), 
where market value is calculated as log (price of outstanding common sharesൈnumber of shares൅book value of 
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preferred stock൅book value of debt) (Miller, 2006). Because the main point of this study is to examine the effects of 
integrating organizational structure and culture after acquisition, it may necessitate sufficient time to complete post-
acquisition integration (Gary, 2005). We focus on the change in the market value over the period surrounding the 
acquisition. This study requires that the sample firms have three years of data available. The acquisition year (t = 0) 
is defined as the year that the acquisition is completed, the pre-acquisition year (t = –1) is defined as one year before 
the acquisition, and the post-acquisition year (t = +1) is defined as one year after the acquisition. Thus, οMarket Value 
is measured as the acquirer’s market value in the post-acquisition year (now the target firm is a part of the acquirer) 
minus the sum of the acquirer’s and target’s market value in the pre-acquisition year. 
3.3. Independent variables 
The similarity of resource or product-market in both acquiring and acquired firms is often assumed to have positive 
impact on acquirers’ post-acquisition performance. In this study, business similarity is assessed by industrial SIC 
codes (Zollo & Singh, 2004) and related and unrelated acquisitions are identified by a binary variable, in which 
acquirers and target firms in the same two-digit industry will be set equal to +1, otherwise –1. Grounded on Zollo and 
Singh (2004), this study measures organizational integration by the acquired managers estimating the degree of 
coordinative activities between acquirer and target firms in (i) joint procurement, (ii) sharing a sales force, (iii) sharing 
production information, (iv) sharing best practices in various administrative processes, and (v) involving the 
combination of resources from different divisions to create new business (5-point scale, Cronbach-ߙ= 0.87). 
Acculturation is measured by the acquired firm’s managers concerning the level of (i) jointly shared meanings 
fostering cooperation between jointing firms, (ii) a joint organizational culture through activities such as cross-visit, 
celebrations, and other rituals, and (iii) the existing culture in the acquired firm is forced to change (7-point scale, 
Cronbach-ߙ= 0.84). 
3.4. Control variables and the endogeneity concerns 
The major concern with cross-sectional studies is endogenous effects that the diversification choice (e.g., 
acquisition) is endogenous to performance (Miller, 2006). Considering endogeneity bias, cross-sectional studies may 
incur problems of endogeneity when inferring the relationship between diversification and performance. This study 
therefore follows the suggestions in diversification-performance studies and uses leverage, post-acquisition 
profitability, and R&D intensity to reduce possible endogeneity bias. Leverage is measured as the ratio of the book 
value of debt to market value, as defined in the dependent variable (Mansi & Reeb, 2002). The acquirer’s Pre-
acquisition firm profitability is measured as the three-year average return on asset (ROA) covering the last three years 
(t–1, t–2, and t–3) before the acquisition. It is examined as industry adjusted profitability by subtracting industry 
average profitability (industry 3 year average ROA). R&D intensity is the acquirer’s R&D expenditure over total 
assets in the year before the acquisition (Miller 2006).  
3.5. Procedures for testing three-term interaction effects: Centering in moderated multiple regression (MMR) using 
unstandardized regression coefficients 
3.5.1. Procedure 1: Using MMR with centered data to reduce potential multicollinearity problem 
MMR is frequently employed to detect interaction effects and is superior to analysis such as comparison of 
subgroup correlation coefficients (Dawson & Richter, 2006; Kraemer et al., 2001). However, the functional 
dependence between independent variables and their interaction terms makes MMR sensitive to the supposed 
multicollinearity problem in most applications. The procedure of centering is therefore recommended as a feasible 
solution to high multicollinearity (Shieh, 2009a). That is, with predictors and their interaction terms in MMR, the 
multicollinearity effects are likely to be reduced if all predictors are centered (Shieh, 2009b). The selection of reference 
value in centering depends on the data scale. In general, mean centering that involves subtracting sample mean from 
each observed value is recommended in continuous predictors (Shieh, 2009a); ordinal predictors are suggested to be 
centered at their medians; and binary independent variable should be coded as +1 and –1 (Kraemer et al., 2001). 
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3.5.2. Procedure 2: using MMR with unstandardized regression coefficients to test 3-way interaction effect in H1 
In order to examine the hypothesized proper fits between strategy, acculturation and organizational integration in 
acquisitions, an MMR model is applied. As these hypotheses postulate that the effects of certain independent variables 
are conditioned by the states of other independent variables, the examination of interaction effects is required. For 
example, W denotes a set of control variables, andܼଵ, ܼଶ, ܼଷ, and Y are measured at the ratio level, the appropriate 
model for testing H1 should be: 
 ൌ ܼଵܼଶܼଷ ൅ܹ ൅ ߝ                                                                                                            (1) 
Given that ଵܺ, ܺଶ, and ܺଷ cannot be measured directly, one must settle for the ordinal measures ଵܺ ൌ ܼଵ ൅ ݌, ܺଶ ൌ
ܼଶ ൅ ݍ, and ܺଷ ൌ ܼଷ ൅ ݎ, where p, q, r are unknown constants. Substituting these measures into (1) yields 
ܻ ൌ ܾሺ ଵܺ െ ݌ሻሺܺଶ െ ݍሻሺܺଷ െ ݎሻ ൅ܹ 
ൌ െܾ݌ݍݎ ൅ ܾݍݎ ଵܺ ൅ ܾ݌ݎܺଶ ൅ ܾ݌ݍܺଷ െ ܾݎ ଵܺܺଶ െ ܾݍ ଵܺܺଷ െ ܾ݌ܺଶܺଷ ൅ ܾ ଵܺܺଶܺଷ ൅ܹ 
ൌ ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵ ଵܺ ൅ ܾଶܺଶ ൅ ܾଷܺଷ ൅ ܾସ ଵܺܺଶ ൅ ܾହ ଵܺܺଷ ൅ ܾ଺ܺଶܺଷ ൅ ܾ଻ ଵܺܺଶܺଷ ൅ܹ ൅ ߝ                                             (2) 
Since variables used in this study are of ordinal level, equation (2) is the appropriate analytical model, in which: Y = 
οMarket value; ଵܺ= Degree of acculturation; ܺଶ= Acquisition strategy (related or unrelated acquisition); ܺଷ= Degree 
of organizational integration; W = Control variables. 
If unstandardized1 regression coefficient ܾ଻, the three-way interaction term, is positive and differs significantly 
from zero, H1 is supported, indicating that the effect of any independent variable depends on the other two. The 
adoption of testing unstandardized ܾ଻ is owing to the following reasons. First, all values and significance level of the 
standardized coefficients ܾଵ to ܾ଻ will change if ordinal variables ௜ܺ are replaced by ௜ܺ ൅ ݇௜, in which ݇௜ is arbitrary 
constant. Moreover, if the origin points of ௜ܺ  change, the values and significance level of the unstandardized 
coefficients ܾଵ to ܾ଺ will change as well. Therefore, it is denoted that the best measure of the importance of the three-
way interaction term ଵܺܺଶܺଷ, is simply the increment to ܴଶ with the inclusion of the product term (Allison, 1983). 
3.5.3. Procedure 3: Using Dawson and Richter formula to test H2, H3 and H4 
A common strategy used to probe three-way interactions is applying subgroup analysis (see Figure 1) on one 
moderator variable and subsequently run separate regressions for subgroups of high and low levels of this moderator. 
However, this strategy cannot test each possible pair of simple slopes (i.e., a test of slope difference for any two simple 
regression lines in Figure 1) for statistical significance. Following the test statistics formula developed by Dawson 
and Richter (2006), a two-step strategy is used to test H2 and H3. First step is a test for monotonicity that ensures the 
linearity assumption of the linear regression model and the second step is to test if the difference between a pair of 
slopes (οslope) equals to zero. 
First Step. Once H1 is supported, a test for monotonicity is suggested (Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990), in which 
linearity of the regression model is examined through the partial derivative of equation (2) over one of the independent 
variable. In H2 and H3, we propose that the selection of acquisition strategy affects the selection of structural 
integration and mode of acculturation. Thus, we fix ܺଶ (acquisition strategy) and examine the interaction between 
ଵܺand ܺଷ. Taking partial derivative of equation (2) with respect to ଵܺ leads to 
డ௒
డ௑భ
ൌ ሺܾଵ ൅ ܾସܺଶሻ ൅ ሺܾହ ൅ ܾ଻ܺଶሻܺଷ                                                                                                                      (3)  
Given ܺଶ ൌ ൅ͳ (related acquisition), equation (3) can be revised as 
డ௒
డ௑భ
ൌ ሺܾଵ ൅ ܾସሻ ൅ ሺܾହ ൅ ܾ଻ሻܺଷ                                                                                                                               (4) 
Given ܺଶ ൌ െͳ (unrelated acquisition), equation (3) can be revised as 
 
 
1 For interval variables, the standardized coefficient of a product term depends on its standard deviation. Allison (1983) proved that the variance of the 
product increases as the means of independent variables depart from zero. If the zero point changes for all independent variables, all (b1 to b7) standardized 
coefficients will change. In contrast, only the values and significance level of the unstandardized coefficients b1 to b6 are invalid because they will change 
if the origin points of independent variables change. As Allison (1983, p. 149) stated, the general rule is “(unstandardized) coefficients for all terms 
involving the transformed interval variable are unaltered; coefficients for all other terms are changed”, i.e., only value and significance level of the 
unstandardized three-way interaction coefficients, b7, is valid and testable in the three-way MMR model. 
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డ௒
డ௑భ
ൌ ሺܾଵ െ ܾସሻ ൅ ሺܾହ െ ܾ଻ሻܺଷ                                                                                                                               (5) 
If the value of ߲ܻ ߲ ଵܺΤ  in Equations (4) or (5) is always positive or negative over the entire range of ܺଷ , the 
relationship between Y and ଵܺwould be regarded monotonic. 
Fig 1. A Three-way interaction plot illustrating simple slopes of Y on X1 at high and low values of X2 and X3 
Second Step. H2b suggests that in related acquisitions (ܺଶ= high), integration (ܺଷ) has a positive moderating effect 
on the relationship between acculturation ( ଵܺ) and post-acquisition performance. As shown in Figure 1, H2b contains 
a comparison of a slope at high ܺଶ (or ܺଶு) and low ܺଷ (ܺଷ௅) with a slope at high ܺଶ (ܺଶு) and high ܺଷ (ܺଷு). That 
is, a slope comparison between lines 2 and 1 in Figure 2. The test statistic in this case is ݐ ൌ ௕ఱା௕ళ௑మಹ
ට௦ఱఱା௑మಹమ ௦ళళାଶ௑మಹ௦ఱళ
  
(Dawson & Richter, 2006). H3b suggests that in unrelated acquisitions (ܺଶ= low), integration (ܺଷ) has positive 
moderating effect on the relationship between acculturation ( ଵܺ) and post-acquisition performance. Thus as indicated 
in Figure 1, H3b contains a comparison of a slope at low ܺଶ (orܺଶ௅) and low ܺଷ (ܺଷ௅) with a slope at low ܺଶ (ܺଶ௅) 
and high ܺଷ (ܺଷு). That is, a slope comparison between lines 4 and 3 in Figure 2. The test statistic in this case is ݐ ൌ
௕ఱା௕ళ௑మಽ
ට௦ఱఱା௑మಽమ ௦ళళିଶ௑మಽ௦ఱళ
. Note degrees of freedom equal to (n – k – 1), where n is the sample size, k is the total number of 
predictors in the regression model. 
Testing H4. H4, predicting a stronger moderating effect of integration in related acquisitions than unrelated ones, 
will be supported if the moderating effect of ܺଷ in related acquisitions, that is ȁܾହ ൅ ܾ଻ȁ in equation (4), is greater than 
that in unrelated acquisitions, i.e. ȁܾହ െ ܾ଻ȁin Equation (5). Given that ܾ଻ is assumed to be positive in H1, ȁܾହ ൅ ܾ଻ȁ ൐
ȁܾହ െ ܾ଻ȁ only if ܾହ ൐ Ͳ, i.e. integration must have positive significant moderating effect on the relationship between 
acculturation type and post-acquisition performance. If H2 and H3 are both supported, H4 is also supported because 
both ܾହ and ܾ଻ ൐ Ͳ. 
4. Results and discussion 
We eliminate the possible multicollinearity by centering independent variables: coding related/unrelated 
acquisition strategy as +1/-1 for the sake of simplifying calculation in Equation (3), and centering acculturation and 
organizational integration at their medians. Considering that the recommended uppermost limit of variance inflation 
factor (VIF) value is 10 (Kleinbaum et al., 1988), value of majors in this study is between 1.20 to 2.05, indicating that 
the problems of multicollinearity tend to be minimal. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables and 
Table 2 shows the results from MMR to the hypotheses. We used one regression equation of acculturation, acquisition 
strategy, organizational integration, the interactions between acculturation and acquisition strategy, acquisition 
strategy and structural integration, as well as acculturation and organizational integration as the independent variables 
(Equation A) and a second adding the three-way interaction included (Equation B). As indicated in Equation B, the 
unstandardized regression coefficient of the three-way interaction is significantly positive (ܾ଻=.21, p < .01). The 
introduction of this three-way interaction term also brings a significant increase in ܴଶ(οܴଶ=.04, p < .01) in △market 
value in acquisitions. The evidence of interaction between acculturation, acquisition strategy and organizational 
integration supports H1. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
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 Means s.d. Min Maxi 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. △Market value   .01   .05 –.10 .15       
2. Acculturation 3.81  1.95  1.05 6.79  .08      
3. Organizational integration  3.21  1.53  1.21  4.93  .12* .22**     
4. Acquisition strategy   .15   .35 –1  1  .02 -.08   .08    
5. Leverage   .26   .24 .05 .50 –.20**  .03  –.03  .06   
6. Pre-acquisition firm profitability   .01   .04 –.07   .15  .15**  .11*   .18** –.01  –.06  
7. R&D intensity   .05   .05 .01   .15  .12* -.01   .12*  .01  -.25** .31** 
Note: N = 154. * p < .05; ** p < .01. 
Concerning related acquisitions, the partial derivative of Equation B in Table 2 over ଵܺ yields 
డ௒
డ௑భ
ൌ ሺܾଵ ൅ ܾସሻ ൅ ሺܾହ ൅ ܾ଻ሻܺଷ ൌ Ǥͻ͸ ൅ Ǥ͵ͳܺଷ                                                                                                     (6) 
Equation (6) will yield zero when centered ܺଷ equals –3.10. Since the range of centered ܺଷ is from –2.6 to 2.7 (level 
of organizational integration), ߲ܻ ߲ ଵܺΤ  is always positive with respect to all possible ܺଷ . In related acquisitions, 
߲ܻ ߲ ଵܺΤ presents positive mnotonicity. t test of slope difference between line 2 (related acquisition, low integration) 
and line 1 (related acquisition, high integration) yields a significant level (p < .05, d.f. = 139), which supports H2b. 
Table 2.  MMR results for the interactive effect of acquisition strategy, organizational integration and acculturation on post-acquisition performance 
a 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept     4.82 
   (3.95)  
    4.95 
   (3.84) 
4.84 
  (3.77) 
3.49 
(3.07) 
3.41 
 (3.46) 
Leverage     –.67** 
    (.28) 
    –.57** 
    (.23) 
   –.60** 
   (.25) 
  –.77** 
  (.30) 
 –.81** 
 (.31) 
Pre-acquisition firm profitability     .59** 
    (.19) 
    .49** 
    (.18) 
    .55** 
    (.15) 
    .62** 
    (.14) 
  .67** 
  (.15) 
R&D intensity     .32** 
    (.11) 
    .33** 
    (.10) 
    .35** 
    (.14) 
    .42** 
    (.15) 
  .38** 
  (.14) 
Acculturation .07† 
(.04) 
.15** 
(.04) 
 –.12** 
 (.04) 
 .08* 
(.03) 
.06* 
(.03) 
Acquisition strategy .89 
(.85) 
    –   – 1.08 
(.75) 
 1.02 
(.66) 
Organizational integration .14† 
(.08) 
.12† 
(.07) 
.13† 
(.07) 
–.02 
(.09) 
–.05 
(.11) 
Acculturation × Acquisition strategyb     1.02** 
(.21) 
  .96** 
(.25) 
Acculturation × Organizational integrationb     .15** 
(.04) 
.10** 
(.03) 
Acquisition strategy ×Organizational integrationb 
 
    1.01 
(.60) 
1.00 
(.66) 
Acculturation × Acquisition strategy × Organizational integrationb     .21** 
(.08) 
      
R2 .24 .27 .27 .31 .35 
△R2    ˉ   ˉ   ˉ .07    .04  
F for △R2     8.52**   6.55** 
a N = 154 for Models 1, 4, 5. N = 94 for Model 2. N = 60 for Model 3. Unstandardized regression coefficients reported. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
b All continuous variables used in interaction terms are centered. Results are similar if uncentered. †p < 0.1; *p < .05; **p < .01. 
With regard to unrelated acquisitions, partial derivative of Equation B in Table 2 over ଵܺ yields: 
డ௒
డ௑భ
ൌ ሺܾଵ െ ܾସሻ ൅ ሺܾହ െ ܾ଻ሻܺଷ ൌ ǤͺͶ െ Ǥͳͳܺଷ                                            (7) 
Equation (7) will yield zero when ܺଷ equals –7.64. Since the range of centered ܺଷ is from –2.6 to 2.7, ߲ܻ ߲ ଵܺΤ is 
always negative with respect to all possibleܺଷ. In unrelated acquisitions, ߲ܻ ߲ ଵܺΤ  presents negative monotonicity. 
And the t test of slope difference between line 4 (unrelated acquisition, low integration) and line 3 (unrelated 
acquisition, high integration) yields a significant level (p < .05, d.f. = 143), which supports H3. 
In testing H4, since ܾହ and ܾ଻ are proved to be significantly positive by the results of H2 and H3, and the results of 
H1 respectively, ȁܾହ ൅ ܾ଻ȁ ൐ ȁܾହ െ ܾ଻ȁ  also supports H4 that predicts that the integration’s moderating effect in 
related acquisitions is stronger than that in unrelated acquisitions. In other words, whenever organizational integration 
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increases 1 unit in related acquisitions, the influence of assimilative acculturation on performance will increase .31 
unit. In unrelated acquisitions, however, whenever organizational integration increases 1 unit, the influence of separate 
acculturation on performance will increase .11 unit. 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 help to have a better understanding of H2 to H4. In related acquisitions (ܺଶ ൌ ൅ͳ), Equation 
(2) can be reduced as 
ܻ ൌ ͳǤͶ͵ ൅ Ǥͻ͸ ଵܺ ൅ Ǥͻͷܺଷ ൅ Ǥ͵ͳ ଵܺܺଷ                      (8) 
As for in unrelated acquisitions (ܺଶ ൌ െͳ), Equation (2) can be reduced as 
ܻ ൌ െǤ͸ͳ ൅ Ǥͻ͸ ଵܺ െ ͳǤͲͷܺଷ ൅ Ǥͳͳ ଵܺܺଷ                  (9) 
Fig 2. Moderating effect of organizational integration on the 
relationship between acculturation and οmarket value in related 
acquisitions (Organizational integration and acculturation are centered 
at their medians) 
Fig 3. Moderating effect of organizational integration on the 
relationship between acculturation and οmarket value in unrelated 
acquisitions (organizational integration and acculturation are centered 
at their medians) 
In general, integration does not have a direct but moderating effect on οMarket Value. Concerning related 
acquisitions (see Fig. 2), when there is no integration, the increment of acculturation on οMarket Value is .34. As 
integration increases 1 unit, the increment of acculturation on ∆Market value will increase .31 unit, indicating the 
strength of moderating effect of integration. When integration reaches its maximum, the increment of acculturation 
on ∆Market value reaches its maximum 1.58, thereby supporting H2. As for unrelated acquisitions (see Fig. 3), when 
there is no integration, the increment of acculturation on οMarket Value is .74. As integration increases 1 unit, the 
increment of acculturation on ∆Market value will increase .11 unit. When integration reaches its maximum, the 
increment of acculturation on ∆Market value reaches its maximum 1.18, thereby supporting H3b. Given that the 
strength of moderating effect of integration in related acquisitions (.31) is greater than that in unrelated acquisitions 
(.11), H4 is hence supported. 
In sum, findings of this study show that: (1) the three-way interaction, or contingency between acquisition strategy 
as well as organizational integration and acculturation have a significant impact on post-acquisition performance; (2) 
tighter acculturation with higher organizational integration relates to superior performance in related acquisitions; (3) 
looser acculturation with higher organizational integration relates to superior performance in unrelated acquisitions; 
(4) integration’s moderating effect in related acquisitions is stronger than that in unrelated acquisitions. In related 
acquisitions, acquirers, due to their knowledge and technological advantages, tend to impose their culture on acquired 
firms (Chatterjee, 1986) and pay less attention to autonomy. In order to reduce costs related to knowledge and 
technology exchange, organizational integration, coordination and cooperation between acquirer and target firm 
should be emphasized and high degrees of acculturation are therefore suggested. In unrelated acquisitions, acquirers 
tend to emphasize high level of multiculturalism due to lack of knowledge and technological advantages. Moreover, 
they avoid intervening in the daily activities of the acquired firms and tend to welcome, benefit as well as honor new 
partnerships. Hence, low degrees of acculturation are preferred. It should be also noticed that tight acculturation does 
not mean over intervention from the acquirer, nor “hands-off”. The relationship between headquarters and the merged 
unrelated divisions could be explained by “the metaphor of the orchestral leader” (Mintzberg, 1998:140). Managers 
in the acquired firms resemble professional musicians in an orchestra in the sense that they are professional in their 
own domain. However, they together cannot produce harmonious music without a conductor, whose responsibility is 
to control elements of music (e.g., pace and tempo) and unify individual musicians by guiding them when to come in 
and how fast or slow to play. In unrelated acquisitions, managers of the headquarters direct those of the acquired firms 
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towards the common missions of the merged unit with support, instead of empowering them with constraints. 
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